

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.200
21 July 1964
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDREDTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

(Sweden)

64-17284

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. G. GHELEV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV
Mr. I. BOEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA
U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. R.M. TAIT
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. V. PECHOTA
Mr. A. MIKULIN
Mr. J. CHMELA

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU
Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE
Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDÓ

Mr. M. TELLO

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU

Mr. P. MATEESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJÖLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH

Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV

Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Mr. S. de PALMA

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): In declaring open today's meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, I cannot refrain from laying particular stress upon the fact that it is the 200th meeting. By some curious coincidence, Sweden functioned as Chairman also at the 100th meeting -- and I recall at what a low tide that was in our proceedings -- in February 1963. Today we do have some results to our credit to look back upon; and the prospects of further agreement also are much brighter. However, if we multiply two hundred meetings by the number of hours and minutes they have occupied, and if we multiply that again by the great number of very competent persons in our delegations, I believe we should ask ourselves if, or when, the results will be fully commensurate with our efforts.

Before giving the floor to the first speaker today, I should like to welcome to our midst once more Mr. Kurka, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, who has been with us before. We are looking forward to his further participation in our work.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): As I am the first speaker today, let me say that I am sure that the Conference as a whole will be grateful to you, Madam Chairman, for recalling the fact that today's meeting is the 200th meeting of this Conference and for giving us a very happily phrased description of the balance between the efforts we have made and the results we have so far achieved. But, as you say yourself, there is always room for more hope. Perhaps it will not be entirely out of place if I say that some of the achievements we have to our credit were considerably aided by the practical and constructive attitude always taken by the delegation of Sweden.

Permit me also to join you, Madam Chairman, in welcoming our friend, Mr. Kurka, back to this Conference.

At our meeting last Tuesday the Committee was informed that our co-Chairmen had so far been unable to agree on the basis for a working party on nuclear delivery vehicles. We were also informed that they would continue their discussions and would report the results to an early meeting of the Conference (ENDC/PV.198, p.5). In that particular connexion I should simply like to reiterate the plea which I made at the same meeting that our co-Chairmen should be given all the time they may require for their discussions.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

In the meantime I should like this morning to develop a thought to which the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Canada referred last Tuesday. The Committee will recall that Mr. Hassan, in his stimulating and thoughtful statement, said:

"Both parties have declared their readiness to engage in detailed discussion of practical issues in a working group, provided that no party imposes its plan as the sole basis for the terms of reference of the working group." (ibid., p.16)

At the same meeting I myself confirmed that that was the position taken by the United Kingdom delegation (ibid., p.21). Indeed, it has been made abundantly clear that this is the position of all the Western delegations. However, as Mr. Burns pointed out last Tuesday, it is by no means clear that this is the position of the Soviet and East European delegations. In fact, it is difficult at the moment to avoid the opposite conclusion, which Mr. Burns stated as being that -

"The Soviet Union's insistence on the Gromyko 'nuclear umbrella' plan to the exclusion of any other plan is preventing agreement on the setting up of a working group". (ibid., p.33)

Needless to say, I hope that this conclusion may prove to be unjustified. But we must be clear on this important point, for it is vital to the whole problem which we are at present trying to resolve.

The Committee will recall from my statement last Tuesday (ibid., p.19) that I had gained the impression that our Soviet colleagues were not necessarily insisting on acceptance of Mr. Gromyko's proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) as a precondition for the establishment of a working group. I had gained that impression from a remark which the Soviet representative, who at that time was Mr. Zorin, made on 30 June. It will be recalled that Mr. Zorin told us at that meeting that his delegation -

"... do not insist that the Gromyko proposal is to be considered and accepted as a proposal".

That quotation is to be found on page 47 of the English provisional verbatim record of the 194th meeting and on page 50 of the Russian provisional verbatim record of the same meeting.^{1/} I myself quoted and welcomed that statement at our meeting last Tuesday.

^{1/} These words were deleted by correction and so do not appear in the final record (p.33)

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But when I studied what our present Soviet colleague said at our meeting last Tuesday, I noted that Mr. Tsarapkin indicated in fairly clear terms (ENDC/PV.198, pp.29, 30) that the so-called "nuclear umbrella" concept which he is apparently asking the Committee to accept in principle is exactly the same as Mr. Gromyko's proposal. Whereas Mr. Zorin was, I had assumed, trying to make a distinction between Mr. Gromyko's proposal as such and what he called the substance behind that proposal (ENDC/PV.194, provisional, p.47), Mr. Tsarapkin seemed to be suggesting that there was in fact no such distinction. Whereas Mr. Zorin had virtually acknowledged that views might differ on how a "nuclear umbrella" might be constituted, Mr. Tsarapkin seemed to suggest that there could be only one "nuclear umbrella", and that that was the Soviet version as outlined in Mr. Gromyko's proposal.

If that is now the Soviet position, I should regard it as a backward move. I may, of course, have misinterpreted Mr. Tsarapkin, and I hope I have. But, if my understanding is correct, we may have to draw the conclusion that our Soviet colleagues have not yet really taken a new step forward to meet the Western Powers, as Mr. Zorin claimed on 9 June that they had done (ENDC/PV.188, p.17). Or, if they did take such a step at the outset of this session, we may have to conclude that they have now taken a step backwards to their position at the last session. It will be recalled that at that time Mr. Tsarapkin repeatedly asked the Committee to accept in principle, not the substance behind the Gromyko proposal -- whatever that may be -- but the proposal itself; a proposal which, as Mr. Zorin himself recently remarked (ENDC/PV.194, p.33), was unclear in a number of important respects. It will also be recalled that Mr. Tsarapkin used to say that only after acceptance in principle of Mr. Gromyko's proposal would the full details be vouchsafed to the Committee.

In the view of the United Kingdom delegation, it would be unfortunate if our Soviet colleagues have in fact reverted to the one-sided approach which they adopted in the past. Mr. Tsarapkin did, of course, deny last Tuesday that "the Soviet delegation wants the working group to consider only the Soviet Union's proposal" (ENDC/PV.198, p.42). I was glad to hear that. But if, as Mr. Tsarapkin implied, the "nuclear umbrella" concept which he is asking the Committee first to accept in principle is, to all intents and purposes, exactly the same as Mr. Gromyko's proposal, then it does seem to us that he is trying to

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produce a result which would be precisely what he said his delegation did not want. Such a result, I submit, could only be described as totally one-sided. Moreover, it is a result which is clearly not desired by a great many representatives round this table.

Let me draw attention again to the remarks of the representative of Nigeria, who made it clear at our meeting of 23 June that the working group's discussions should not be restricted to one plan or the other. As we all recall, Mr. Obi said:

"It could well be that after ... discussions [in a working group] a solution would emerge confirming the soundness of one plan or the other, or, even more likely and appropriately, a realistic compromise solution." (ENDC/PV.192, p.19)

The Indian representative, in what has been recognized generally, I think, as a particularly thoughtful and constructive statement, pointed out at our meeting of 30 June that his delegation had not agreed that the study by the working group should be "confined to the proposals of only one side" (ENDC/PV.194, p.11). Mr. Nehru went on to say:

"Both sides --and indeed all delegations -- should have the right to make proposals on the basis of the terms of reference." (ibid.)

The Committee will also recall that at the same meeting the Ethiopian representative said:

"The principal object of the working group should be to examine and appraise all proposals, explore the areas of agreement, and devise a realistic and practical measure acceptable to both sides." (ibid., p.28)

Lij Imru went on to say:

"... we cannot afford to restrict too narrowly the terms of reference of the working group." (ibid.)

Earlier in my remarks this morning I referred to an observation by Mr. Hassan in the same sense, which made it clear that he too is not in favour of one party's trying to impose its plan as the sole basis for the terms of reference of the working group (ENDC/PV.198, p.16).

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It is clear from all those quotations that the Committee as a whole does not want a working group whose terms of reference are confined to the proposals of only one side. That view is shared fully by Western delegations. We have often stated that we do not wish to adopt a purely one-sided approach to this matter. We have often expressed our readiness to discuss and examine all proposals, and in particular Mr. Gromyko's proposals, on a priority basis if necessary, in the working group. We have often stated, and I state again today, that in such a group we should welcome the discussion of proposals from whatever quarter they are advanced. In particular, we look forward to contributions in that group from our non-aligned colleagues, who may well have views on how we should all attain our common long-term objective. It seems to us totally one-sided and quite unacceptable that the working group should be precluded by its terms of reference from examining all relevant proposals.

As I said earlier, I very much fear that Mr. Tsarapkin's statement at our meeting last Tuesday may prove to show that the Soviet delegation has taken a backward step on this point. Moreover, I fear that I cannot agree with our Soviet colleague's statement last Tuesday that the remarks which he was then about to make would clarify the various points in which the delegation of the United Kingdom was interested and that I should be satisfied afterwards with the items of information he was proposing to give us (ibid., p.23).

His observations on that occasion could be justified only on the assumption that he had supposed that I had been arguing against the inclusion in the tasks of the working group of an examination of Mr. Gromyko's proposal. But that is precisely what I had not been arguing. I emphasized --- as I have emphasized again today --- that we should be very ready to see the working group examine Mr. Gromyko's proposal as well as proposals from whatever quarter they were advanced.

We recognize that the Soviet and other delegations are perfectly entitled to criticize the Western plan. But we in the West are equally entitled to criticize, as indeed we have done, the Soviet plan and in particular Mr. Gromyko's proposal. The fact that at present neither side seems able to accept each other's plan is surely no reason against the establishment of a working group which we all want.

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On the contrary, I should have thought that this was precisely one of the main reasons why such a group should be set up --- for I believe that it will be only in this way that the present differences between both sides can in due course be resolved and that agreement in this particular and important field can eventually be reached.

Having said that, however, I agree of course with those representatives who have stressed the need for an agreed basis for the working group and the need for mutually-acceptable terms of reference. As our colleague from Mexico pointed out on 7 July --

"... the working group's terms of reference ... must .. be both precise and flexible for we see no logical incompatibility between the two ..." (ENDC/PV.196, p.6)

Our co-Chairmen are still charged with the responsibility of finding that basis and of negotiating those terms of reference. We must therefore all continue to encourage them in their efforts. We in the United Kingdom delegation shall certainly do all we can to make their task easier. If I may say so, the interventions of our non-aligned colleagues in our recent plenary debates have shown a similar desire to be of help in furthering our co-Chairmen's efforts.

I believe that these efforts will be successful; for I cannot repeat too often that, in the opinion of the United Kingdom delegation, there is already sufficient common ground between the positions of both sides to make agreement possible on the establishment of a working group. I noted that this opinion was shared by our colleague from the United Arab Republic when he discerned last week --

"... three interdependent elements weighing heavily in favour of a reasonable solution of this problem, which if solved will pave the way to the solution of the other important problems of general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.198, p.13)

I believe that that opinion is shared increasingly by other delegations in the Conference.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I have very carefully re-read our Eastern colleagues' recent speeches about the creation of a working group on the reduction and elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, and I have discerned therein a certain confusion and even certain contradictions. Hence I deem it useful,

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as the United Kingdom representative has just done, to make a fresh examination of the question in order, if possible, to cast more light on the present situation in our negotiations.

In our efforts to follow the Soviet delegation's line of thought, we came to the conclusion that it wants the Committee to approve the Gromyko plan (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) in principle before the creation of a working group on the reduction of delivery vehicles. I could cite several passages to support that interpretation, but I do not really think it necessary.

Nevertheless, the Eastern delegations seem to be disputing this point; they explain that they are merely asking for advance approval of the principle of the "nuclear umbrella". But a study of their speeches shows that, in their view, the principle of the "nuclear umbrella" and the Gromyko plan are essentially the same thing. The "nuclear umbrella" is in fact identical with the Gromyko proposal. At least, that is the impression one receives from a perusal of their speeches. The Eastern delegations have repeatedly stated that the quantity of vehicles to be retained at the various stages under the Western proposals, within the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, does not in their opinion constitute a "nuclear umbrella". There is therefore only one "nuclear umbrella", and that is the Gromyko plan.

Hence, if the Soviet delegation is asking for advance approval of its "nuclear umbrella", it is also asking for advance approval of the Gromyko proposal itself, to the exclusion of any other proposal. It is therefore not surprising that the West should be unable to accept this demand. The Gromyko proposal was examined very carefully for three months at our last session. We made a patient and active contribution to that study, which showed that the Western delegations cannot, with the best will in the world regard that proposal as in conformity with the principles of balance and control. We gave our reasons at length, while seeking to convince our Eastern partners that a step-by-step elimination of vehicles in accordance with those principles could be worked out on the basis of the Western proposals.

To be sure, we do not claim a monopoly of wisdom. This remark, which I made during one of my earlier speeches (ENDC/PV.196, p.13), has been taken up by the Eastern delegations as a sort of proof that it is they who possess that monopoly. In reality, I feel that both sides must renounce any claims to such a monopoly. If we are to achieve any results, there must be a free exchange of ideas -- that is, a free examination of all proposals within this Committee. Only thus shall we discover

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which proposals really correspond to the principles of balance and control, and also which may be realistically regarded as applicable. We are not insisting on this because we have made a fetish of the Agreed Principles but because, if we do not apply those principles, we shall inevitably fail and compromise our security.

The working group must thus base its activities on those principles and be constantly guided by them, as was rightly recognized and stressed by the delegations of the uncommitted countries, notably by those who spoke at our last meeting but one: for instance Mr. Hassan, representative of the United Arab Republic, in point 4 of his outline plan of 14 July (ENDC/PV.198, p.17). On the same day the Nigerian representative, Mr. Obi, also spoke (*ibid.*, p.32) about the elimination of means of delivering nuclear weapons in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5).

These positions are perfectly natural. No one would dream of calling in question the Agreed Principles in connexion with the reduction of delivery vehicles. Nevertheless, we must draw the necessary practical and logical conclusions from them when preparing the directives to be followed by the working group in elaborating appropriate measures for the step-by-step elimination of delivery vehicles.

Thus, if the working group were to take as a basis one of the proposals before us to the exclusion of the others, that would be tantamount to saying that the problem has been solved, when in fact it has not. We should be deciding here and now that one proposal conforms to the Agreed Principles and that another does not. On the contrary, it is the very conformity or otherwise of a particular proposal to the Agreed Principles that the working group has to examine on the basis of detailed technical data. It is as a result of that fresh detailed technical examination that we shall be able to escape from the present impasse and select the most appropriate and effective system for reducing by rapid stages the number of delivery vehicles within the framework of general and complete disarmament.

I repeat: within the framework of general and complete disarmament. That link between the step-by-step reduction to zero of delivery vehicles and other measures of general and complete disarmament must be stressed yet again, as was rightly done

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by the delegations of several unaligned countries; for the Eastern delegations seem to regard the step-by-step elimination of delivery vehicles as a measure quite independent of other aspects of disarmament, in fact as a collateral measure. Clearly, the elimination of delivery vehicles cannot be envisaged independently of all the other provisions and undertakings of total disarmament, whether nuclear or conventional. I am aware that in the treaty the chapter on delivery vehicles is an important and fundamental one --- perhaps the most important **and** the most fundamental -- but it is still only one chapter among many.

Certain Eastern delegations have expressed the view that I am placing too great a burden on the working group. The Czechoslovak representative said he was astonished that I should want to include in the terms of reference the examination of the question of collective security (ENDC/PV.198, p.39). My reply is as follows. We rather agree here in recognizing -- at any rate, that is our view --- that, as the military forces of States or groups of States are reduced, an adequate collective security organization must be established pari passu. Thus, if it were decided that during the first stage of disarmament, owing to slowness in starting, reduction of armaments would take place on a small scale, it would be enough to establish during that stage an embryonic collective organization which could be further developed during subsequent stages. But, if the reduction of vehicles were completed during the first stage, or were at least very extensive, the organization of collective security would become urgent and would have to be examined as a matter of priority.

I therefore think that the Eastern delegations should, in view of their position on the question of vehicles, be the first to call for the study by the working group of the organization of collective security. To be sure, I am fully aware of the magnitude of the task which, for that and other reasons, would fall to the lot of the working group. But no one should be surprised by that, least of all the Eastern delegations, for, by their own admission, the problem of vehicles is one of the most important.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Of course, the study group cannot do everything at once. A systematic time-table would have to be drawn up for the study of the various problems. The initial solutions would of necessity be partial ones and would have to be regarded as provisional. Subsequent developments would show whether they could be accepted as final. For instance, once appropriate solutions have been found for the problem of a balanced reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles, they will have to be compared with possible solutions to control problems, in order to determine whether the former fulfil all the necessary conditions.

To speed up the work, we could even think of forming several groups which would study the various problems simultaneously, and seek parallel provisional solutions in each sector. These solutions could afterwards be co-ordinated so as to arrive at an overall final solution.

It would, however, be premature to tackle at the present juncture this problem of method and system. Today I merely wanted to say that my delegation does not wish to overload the study group needlessly, it simply wishes to ensure that the study group does not engage in fragmentary and unco-ordinated -- and thus ineffective and sterile -- activity. Only if the working group is given ample but precise terms of reference can the results of its activities be satisfactory; those terms of reference should be carried out as quickly as possible, care being taken to avoid overlapping and to establish sound co-ordination in space and time.

What is important at present is that the co-Chairmen should come to an agreement as soon as possible on the creation of a working group whose task would be to examine the fixing of concerted levels for nuclear delivery vehicles, to the exclusion of all others, within the framework of general and complete disarmament and in accordance with the Agreed Principles.

Mr. TIMBERLAKE (United States of America). I too should like to salute the happy coincidence that has put Sweden in the chair on two occasions marking major anniversaries of this Committee. Madam Chairman, the contributions which you and your predecessors have made to this Committee are not, however, coincidental, they have been carefully planned and have greatly helped all of us to make headway with the important work before us.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

I should also like to join previous speakers in welcoming back to this Conference Mr. Kurka, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, and Mr. Lobodycz.

A study of the records of the recent Tuesday meetings of this Committee shows, I believe, that we are engaged in two parallel discussions. One of those discussions concerns procedure; the quest for an agreed basis on which to set up a working group on nuclear delivery vehicles. The other discussion involves substance: the relative merits of the Soviet and the Western proposals for reducing nuclear delivery vehicles. Our Soviet colleague has fused those two discussions together. I should like today to endeavour to separate them in order to help focus our deliberations.

The question of setting up a working group, as I have said, is procedural. It is to find a basis for a detailed examination of the technical and practical factors involved in the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles under a disarmament agreement.

The question of substance has been, of course, before this Conference since its inception. The importance of the problem, its technical complexities, and the considerable difference in approach between the Soviet and the Western proposals, all help to explain why so little progress has been made towards reaching agreement. For those very reasons we welcomed the Soviet suggestion of a working group. We believe that such a group could better study in the necessary depth and detail the various factors which must be considered, and facilitate the attainment of an acceptable solution to the problem. But to promote progress on the substantive issue by means of a procedural device -- the establishment of a working group -- is one thing; to decide the substantive issue on procedural grounds is quite another. In essence that is what the Soviet representative is asking. He insists on substantive agreement on the principle of the Soviet proposal as a precondition for entering into working-group deliberations.

The Soviet attempt to make the working group depend on a substantive agreement is perhaps understandable. Since 1962 the Soviet Union has been asking the West to accept the so-called Gromyko plan (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) in principle, promising that after we did so we should be told what we had accepted. We have tried in vain

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to elicit enough information about the Gromyko plan to make a considered judgement. Now we have been told that it was never a specific proposal at all, but rather a "proposal of principle (ENDC/PV.194, p.32)". We were encouraged by that statement of Mr. Zorin's as was the United Kingdom representative, for it seemed to indicate some flexibility in the Soviet position; but it remains very difficult to understand what that position is, since the Soviet Union still avoids answering our questions. Now it says that the details of its proposal can best be examined by a working group after it has been accepted as the sole basis for the group's work.

Let me reiterate once more that we have no objection to the discussion of the Gromyko proposal with its "nuclear umbrella". We have no objection to its being considered first in working-group discussions. Our sole insistence is that we should not be asked to approve it in advance of those discussions, to the exclusion of other proposals, and that we should not be asked to make a decision of substance for procedural reasons. It seems to me that this is a reasonable position. If the Committee can accept it, and if we can make a clear distinction between procedure and substance, then I believe the procedural problem can be speedily resolved to the great advantage of our work.

Before suggesting a means of solving the problem of procedure, I should like to discuss briefly one substantive aspect of the issue of nuclear vehicle reduction and elimination.

Many statements have been made regarding the present level of nuclear deterrence. It is generally recognized that under existing conditions nuclear weapons constitute a deterrent to aggression. At the same time, there is a tendency to consider existing nuclear arsenals as excessive for that purpose.

I think we all recognize that increasing armaments offer diminishing security. But confusion arises from the assumption that some absolute level of deterrence lower than the present level can somehow be established for delivery vehicles alone and that this will alleviate the danger of nuclear war. That assumption grossly oversimplifies the problems involved. Nuclear delivery vehicles form part of existing defence structures. Their elimination must be considered in relation to the other parts of these structures. They cannot be treated as if they existed in a vacuum.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

Last week the Soviet representative bombarded us with so-called "over-kill" arguments to deprecate the United States percentage reduction proposal. That line of argument is based entirely on theoretical figures -- numbers of nuclear delivery vehicles, numbers of people, numbers of potential deaths. But numbers alone or theoretical estimates of total explosive power do not tell the story. The composition of the United States deterrent, for example, depends on many factors. The primary consideration is the requirement to be able to deter a variety of potential threats with a variety of potential responses. In judging the size of our deterrent the number of nuclear delivery vehicles we possess, their type, yield and deployment, are all equally important considerations. So are geographical factors, and the degree of invulnerability of those vehicles.

Moreover, we presume -- as did Mr. Burns last week (ENDC/PV.198, p.34) -- that the Soviet nuclear deterrent is composed on a similar basis. We presume also that it is not a static calculation made once for all time. Mr. Tsarapkin is able to play with various numbers concerning the Western side because his Government does not reveal any such figures. If he wants to play the game fairly, however, let us receive the Soviet figures and see how vulnerable they may be to Mr. Tsarapkin's own arguments. Better yet, let us resist the temptation to exploit the propaganda aspects of this serious problem in our search for a solution.

Last week Mr. Tsarapkin levelled the charge that the United States desired the maintenance of the present nuclear deterrent level whereas everyone else would like to reduce it (ibid., p.25). That statement is refuted by the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty (ENDC/30 and Add.1, 2, 3). We want to find an agreed method of reduction which will not endanger anyone's security. We will not agree, however, to a plan which would deprive the West of adequate security during the disarmament process.

We agree that a rough balance of military power now exists between the two nuclear sides. Mr. Lachs mentioned that fact the other day (ENDC/PV.195, p.22). The factors making up the balance are not, however, limited to nuclear weapons -- as I said before --, and they are not always comparable in numbers. For this reason we have advanced our plan for percentage reductions across the board, to scale down the present levels of armaments and still maintain a balance. We are willing to subject our approach to a detailed study in a working group. All we ask is that the Soviet Union should do the same with its approach.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

As Mr. Burns pointed out last week (ENDC/PV.198, p.34), we have proposed interim steps to prevent the growth of armament arsenals, such as a freeze on strategic offensive and defensive nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/PV. 197, pp.5 et seq.). We hope the Soviet Union will seriously consider freezing that level until we can agree on reduction.

I should now like to comment on another aspect of the Soviet position. This is the contention that the "nuclear umbrella", as put forward by the Soviet Union, is not a Soviet proposal but a compromise. We recall that Mr. Zorin earlier claimed (ENDC/PV.194, p.33) that it reflected the so-called principle of the Gromyko plan. Mr. Tsarapkin stated that the term "nuclear umbrella" no longer represented the Soviet position; but he then said that it was --

"... based not on the abandonment of the principle of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage ..."

(ENDC/PV.198, p.30).

Frankly, it is difficult to find a compromise in that statement. Mr. Tsarapkin argued also that the concept of the "nuclear umbrella", as he explained it, had world-wide support and that only the United States refusal to accept this concept hindered progress (ibid., p.24). But exactly what is it that the world supports? In our view, the world looks to this Conference to find a means for reducing the nuclear threat as rapidly as possible, consistent with security. That is exactly what we are trying to do. But it is also our task to look behind catch-phrases to the basic considerations which govern the quest for disarmament and peace.

We are convinced that the use of the term "nuclear umbrella" by the delegations of non-aligned countries is not intended to reflect acceptance of an exclusively Soviet position. The Soviet position has not been elaborated into any specific plan as the Soviet representative now admits (ENDC/PV.194, p.32) -- and we do not believe that any delegation represented here is ready to endorse a proposal merely because it exists in the minds of one delegation. What various delegations have, in fact, pointed out is the general agreement that some nuclear delivery vehicles should be retained until the end of stage III and that a working group could consider the level of such vehicles, or "nuclear umbrella", to be retained at each stage.

Those are the views I wished to give to the Committee regarding the substance of the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles. I now turn to the procedural problem: how can we best proceed with this issue and resolve it?

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

One principal argument has been made in favour of establishing a working group, and one principal argument has been made against it. The favourable argument, as I have already indicated, is that a working group can come to grips with the very complex and difficult issues involved better than the Conference as a whole. The adverse argument is that unless the working group has specific terms of reference it will not be able to accomplish anything. Let me deal with the second argument first.

It is certainly true that the larger the area of agreement in approaching any discussion, the more sharply the discussion can be focussed to resolve remaining disagreement. But it is a matter of judgement to decide how large the area of pre-existing agreement must be in order to permit useful discussion. Several representatives have referred to the existing areas of agreement. These areas were ably described on 16 June by the representative of the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.190, pp.18-20). In my judgement, as in that of the United Kingdom representative, the areas of existing agreement are sufficient to make useful discussions possible in a working group. I therefore believe that we should try to establish one.

I have no doubt that, if we were in agreement with our Soviet colleagues on a method for nuclear vehicle reductions, the deliberations of the working group could be expedited. The fact is, however, that such agreement simply does not yet exist. Therefore we cannot accept a substantive proposal or principle which has never been clearly defined simply for the sake of creating a working group, much as we should like to see such a group established.

In these circumstances, the working group will simply require broader terms of reference than those favoured by the Soviet representative. We must find terms which can accommodate the proposals of both sides as well as all other relevant suggestions which have been conveyed in the course of our discussions.

We have studied the thoughtful and carefully-considered contributions which the non-aligned members of our Conference have made towards finding a formula for the working group. As our United Kingdom colleague showed us this morning, their statements have reflected the specific desire not to limit the studies of the working group to a vague proposal advanced by one side only. The United States has taken into consideration the suggested formulations they have put forward.

With that in mind, we have approached the co-Chairmen talks with a concept which we believe reflects the spirit of these suggestions. It is that a working group should be established to examine the retention of agreed levels of nuclear

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delivery vehicles throughout the disarmament process, with the elimination of all other nuclear delivery vehicles at the earliest practicable time consistent with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5).

I submit that the concept I have suggested is reasonable, fair and practical. It would ensure consideration of the Soviet plan as well as the Western plan. Mr. Zorin stated on 30 June that the working group could consider the retention of a "certain portion" of nuclear vehicles (ENDC/PV.194, p.32). Presumably it could study the features of that certain portion. All this would be possible under our concept.

Let me summarize our position. We do not accept Mr. Tsarapkin's demand that we choose between two substantive proposals in order to settle a procedural question. Our concept for the working group solves this procedural question without compromising the position of either side. It would include the proposals relevant to agenda item 5(b) (ENDC/52), and it would accord with our agreed disarmament principles. We believe that a working group established on the basis of our concept could concentrate on the special problems involved in the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles.

We are disappointed that the Soviet Union has not yet been able to accept a formulation which would allow an early establishment of this working group. We maintain our hope, however, that agreement will emerge from future meetings of the co-Chairmen.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Permit me to join you, Madam Chairman, in welcoming the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Karel Kurka, whom we all know very well from his past work in this Committee as an expert on the problem of disarmament.

I should also like to welcome the representative of Poland, Mr. Lobodycz, who has returned to our midst after a short absence. We are very glad that Mr. Lobodycz is again taking part in our discussions.

The discussion of the question of the creation of a working group to consider the practical questions deriving from the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" has now reached the stage where it would be useful to investigate what is preventing agreement from being reached, why we are marking time instead of moving forward. It seems to us all the more necessary to do so because during the past week the co-Chairmen have not been able to reach agreement on the basis for the activities of the working group.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The statements made today by the representatives of Western Powers, Sir Paul Mason, Mr. Cavalletti and Mr. Timberlake, have not brought any clarity into our discussion, nor do they move forward the negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The discussion on the terms of reference of the working group and the basis for its activities has shown that our path is beset with certain difficulties, which by no means spring from differences in regard to organization or procedure but from differences in regard to the substance of the problem.

What, then, is really the trouble, what are the reasons why the problem of determining the basis for the activities of the working group has turned out to be much more difficult than some delegations, to judge by their statements, first imagined? The reason for our failure to reach agreement is not that one or the other side lacks the ability to formulate mutually-acceptable terms of reference for the working group. If that were the only reason, the trouble would not be very great; there would be no difficulty in coping with it. Everyone realizes, however, that the roots of the difficulties which the Committee is now encountering in determining the basis for the activities of the working group lie very much deeper. These difficulties spring from the fact that we have no common mutually-acceptable approach to the solution of this problem. One cannot help asking why this is so.

At recent meetings of the Committee devoted to the problem of general and complete disarmament, the representatives of the Western Powers have already attempted to give an answer to this question. Today they have repeated their attempts. And their answer is that the main obstacle to an agreement is the insistent demand of the Soviet Union that the activities of the working group should be based on only one proposal -- the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" --, whereas the Western Powers deem it necessary to consider in the working group both the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" and the United States proposal for a percentage reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

At the meeting of 30 June the United States representative, Mr. Foster, said:

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"The Soviet representative insists that the Gromyko proposal be accepted as the basis for negotiations and that it be the sole proposal considered by the working group. We, on the other hand, do not insist on our proposal as the only basis for negotiations. Nor do we insist on selecting it as the only plan to put before the working group. We believe that the working group should consider any reasonable proposal within, and any relevant consideration to, the nuclear delivery item on the agreed plan of work." (ENDC/PV.194, p.27)

At the meeting of 7 July the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavallotti, in advocating the consideration by the working group of both the "nuclear umbrella" proposal and the United States percentage plan, described our position, which envisages that only the "nuclear umbrella" proposal should be the basis for the activities of the working group, as likely to distort the problem and cause dangerous confusion (ENDC/PV.196, p.11).

At the meeting of 14 July the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, asserted that the Soviet position on this question is based on a "one-sided argument" and is therefore unacceptable to the Western Powers (ENDC/PV.198, p.20). But at that meeting the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, who is usually so calm and self-restrained, went even further than Sir Paul Mason and stated that the Soviet side -

"... wish to impose their plan -- the elimination of all nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage, with the exception of the limited number provided under the Gromyko proposal ... -- and that is to be the only proposal under discussion in the working group. The Soviet Union's insistence on the Gromyko 'nuclear umbrella' plan to the exclusion of any other plan is preventing agreement on the setting up of a working group." (ibid., p.33)

So that, it appears, is where the trouble lies -- in the unyielding attitude of the Soviet Union, the lack of flexibility in our position. Hence the inevitable conclusion; the Soviet Union must abandon its rigid position and go forward to meet the Western Powers on the question of the terms of reference of the working group, and then everything will be all right.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

However, is this really so, representatives of the Western Powers? Have you drawn a true picture of the situation in your statements? The facts tell us that you are giving an artificial and false interpretation of the situation which has arisen on the question of the working group and its tasks. In reality -- and you know this perfectly well -- it is precisely the Soviet Union, which, by submitting the "nuclear umbrella" proposal, has gone forward to meet the position of the Western Powers, and gone a long way indeed. I should like to remind you that our original plan of general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2) did not provide for any "umbrella" at any stage. Our original plan was based on the idea that all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles -- all without exception -- including missiles of all types and categories, should be eliminated in the first stage.

We still consider that this would be the very best method of solving the question of the elimination of delivery vehicles, the surest, the most reliable method of really averting the threat of nuclear war in the very first stage of general and complete disarmament. But the Western Powers refused to accept our plan in its original form; they stated both here within the Committee and outside the Committee that our proposal would endanger the security of the West and that it entailed a great risk and involved many unknown factors which could arise in the disarmament process.

Frankly speaking, we have never considered these fears justified; we have always considered and still consider them to be of a far-fetched and artificial nature. No one can deny that the best guarantee of the security of States is disarmament itself, and that in this respect it is precisely the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the very first stage that is of particularly great importance. But since the Western Powers, on the pretext of anxiety for their security in the event of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles being eliminated in the first stage of disarmament, continued to oppose such a solution to the question, we proposed as an additional guarantee of security that the Soviet Union and the United States should retain right up to the end of the disarmament process a "nuclear umbrella" -- that is, a strictly limited and agreed quantity of intercontinental, anti-missile and ground-to-air missiles. We took this step as a concession, as a compromise.

That is what happened when the Soviet Union displayed flexibility, took into account the considerations voiced by the representatives of the Western Powers and agreed to a compromise. Our compromise proposal on delivery vehicles, which provides for their

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

elimination in the first stage while retaining the "nuclear umbrella" till the end of the disarmament process, was appreciated both at the General Assembly of the United Nations and by the majority of delegations here in the Committee, as well as by the broadest circles of world public opinion, including the world-famous scientists participating in the Pugwash Conferences and by the prominent social and political leaders participating in the East-West meetings, as a sensible and realistic basis for solving the most difficult and important problem of the negotiations on general and complete disarmament: the problem of the actual elimination of the threat of a nuclear war in as short a time as possible - that is, at the very beginning of the disarmament process. You know this perfectly well, and it is hardly necessary for me to cite any views and statements by way of confirmation.

If we follow the chain of the development of events even further, I do not think anyone will dispute the fact that it was precisely from the moment the Soviet Government submitted its "nuclear umbrella" proposal that a practical possibility arose to pass on from the general debate on the question of delivery vehicles to the practical work of coming to terms on the concrete details relating to the "umbrella" itself and, subsequently, on the details relating to the order of elimination of delivery vehicles. This possibility did not exist before; but since the Soviet Union agreed to a compromise it has emerged.

The delegation of India put forward on 24 March the idea that, in order to transform the possibility which has arisen into reality, we should approve in principle the "nuclear umbrella" proposal, which ensures that the interests of all parties are observed, and turn to a business-like discussion of the concrete, practical questions deriving from this proposal (ENDC/PV.177, p.28). The proposal of the Indian delegation was natural and logical; it created a possibility for moving forward in the negotiations. For this reason even at the previous session of the Committee we adopted a positive attitude towards that proposal and at the beginning of the current session we made our approach more specific by proposing the establishment of a working group to deal with the concrete, practical questions connected with the "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/PV.188, p.17).

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

What are these questions ? We have mentioned them on a number of occasions and can repeat them once again: the quantity of missiles which are to remain at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States up to the end of the disarmament process, the types of these missiles, their yield, the principles governing their disposition, the system of control over them and the order of their elimination in the concluding stage of general and complete disarmament. Here, as you see, there is something to work on; here the help of specialists is really needed; consequently it is more expedient to examine these questions, not at plenary meetings of the Committee, but in an appropriate working body.

A number of delegations, including the delegations of India (ENDC/PV.194, p.10), the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.198, p.17), Nigeria (ENDC/136), and Ethiopia (ENDC/PV.194, p.28), have submitted somewhat different formulae concerning the basis for the activities of the working group. As the representatives who submitted these formulae explained to the Committee, they endeavoured in drafting them to reach a compromise and to take into account the interest of all parties. We can certainly say that these delegations made a useful contribution to the solution of the problem confronting us. Although their formulae differ from ours and although we do not consider them altogether perfect, on the whole they go in the right, realistic direction. Indeed, they refer both to the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles -- with the exception of the "nuclear umbrella" -- at the earliest stage of disarmament and to the limitation of the size of the "umbrella" to an agreed minimum quantity of delivery vehicles.

This idea -- that the "nuclear umbrella" should be strictly limited and minimum and that all remaining nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be eliminated at the earliest stage of disarmament -- ran through the statements made by representatives of non-aligned States at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly and subsequently in our Committee. Thus the representative of Sweden, Mr. Sohlman, speaking in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 30 October 1963, stated:

"... the most important new element, introducing a fundamental change in the very perspective under which we have to perceive the disarmament process, has, it seems to our delegation, been brought about by the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the concept of the 'nuclear umbrella', that is, the retainment

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"by the two main parties in the present power balance of the world of a nuclear force, considerably reduced in volume and yet sufficiently effective as a deterrent,..." (A/C.1/PV.1321, p.56)

The representative of Nigeria, Mr. Okilo, speaking in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 4 November 1963, stated:

"... the core of the problem --- nuclear disarmament and controls --- remained basically untouched until the Gromyko proposals of 26 September 1962, during the last session --- proposals providing for an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles of the ground-to-air category to be retained by the United States and the Soviet Union in their own territories --- threw a ray of light and hope towards a possible solution of this problem." (A/C.1/PV.1325, p.8-10)

The representatives of India, the United Arab Republic, Burma, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iraq, Iran, Peru, Cyprus and many other States also spoke in support of the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella".

At both the previous and the present sessions of the Committee the representatives of non-aligned countries have also advocated a strictly limited "nuclear umbrella" and the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the earliest possible stage of disarmament. Precisely this approach was reflected also in those proposals concerning the basis for the activities of the working group which have been made at recent meetings by the representatives of India, the United Arab Republic, Nigeria and Ethiopia.

In this connexion I should like to say that a useful idea, in our view, was expressed at the meeting of the Committee on 14 July by the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi, when he referred to the advisability of bringing representatives, who have submitted their own concrete proposals regarding the terms of reference of the working group, into the meetings of the co-Chairmen on this question (ENDC/PV.198, p.31). We think that this could help the work of the co-Chairmen, and the Soviet delegation supports such an idea. We have already had a talk on this subject with our United States colleague. I think that Mr. Timberlake himself will reply to Mr. Obi in connexion with his proposal.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

That is how the matter stands. The gist of the situation is not that we are imposing anything on anyone, as you, Mr. Burns, stated in trying to distort the substance of the matter, but that the submission by the Soviet Government of the compromise proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" has created a possibility for businesslike, practical work in the working group on the relevant questions. Whether advantage will be taken of this possibility or not depends solely on the Western Powers. If they agree to approve in principle the "nuclear umbrella", as the representatives of the other countries members of the Committee have already done, the working group will be set up and can begin its detailed study of the questions deriving from the "nuclear umbrella" concept, including the technical aspects of these questions.

We do not at all demand that the Western Powers should accept any concrete plan of ours for the creation of a "nuclear umbrella". In this connexion we still completely fail to understand the remark made today by Sir Paul Mason, who alleged that we wanted the working group to discuss only one concrete "nuclear umbrella" proposal and that the Soviet delegation had now taken a step backwards in that respect. Where did Sir Paul Mason get all this from ?

On the contrary, what we propose, Sir Paul Mason, is to discuss in a working group all the details of the "nuclear umbrella", to examine all its aspects and to study all points and all proposals on this score. In the group the representatives of the Western Powers will have wide and equal opportunities to advance and discuss their own concrete proposals on the number of missiles to be retained within the framework of the "nuclear umbrella", their yield, and all other similar questions. Negotiations are negotiations, and in them, as some representatives have already stated here, no one can claim a monopoly of wisdom.

But if the Western Powers are not yet prepared to agree to the principle laid down in the "nuclear umbrella" proposal, and if, consequently, they still do not want a compromise solution to the question of the elimination of delivery vehicles, then what sense is there in setting up a working group ? Nothing worth while could come from such a working group.

Yes, the crux of the matter is now as follows: are the Western Powers willing to agree to a compromise on the question of the order of elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles; or do they intend as before to insist on their approach of a

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percentage reduction of these vehicles, an approach which would permit the retention of the material possibilities of waging a nuclear war up to the end of the disarmament process ?

The objective fact is that the United States and its NATO allies, as the whole course of the discussion in the Committee shows, unfortunately are still not prepared to agree to a compromise on this question and to accept in principle the "nuclear umbrella" proposal. They continue to cling to their old proposals for a percentage reduction of delivery vehicles although it has been shown on many occasions, including our 198th meeting, on the basis of numerous facts that these proposals are aimed at retaining to the very end of the disarmament process the material possibilities of unleashing a devastating nuclear war, the material means for what is called the "over-kill capacity" to destroy everything living on our planet. For this reason alone these proposals are unsuitable for use in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament. Acceptance of such an approach would be an obvious concession to militarism.

The representatives of the Western Powers, evidently feeling some embarrassment as a result of their refusal to accept the "nuclear umbrella" proposal as a basis, continue to make futile attempts to create the impression that it is difficult for them to agree to the "nuclear umbrella" because this proposal is still not altogether clear and because all the details have not been worked out. This was mentioned, in particular, by Sir Paul Mason at the meeting on 14 July when he tried to make out that the Western Powers would be able to determine their attitude in principle to the "nuclear umbrella" proposal only when they knew the full details of this proposal (ENDC/PV.198, p.22). The United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, has spoken today on roughly the same lines.

But we have already replied to such statements a good many times, and at present we would remind you once again of the simple truth that the establishment of a working group derives from the need to work out the details of the "nuclear umbrella", and to work them out by our joint efforts. At present, however, it is necessary to reach agreement on the very substance of the matter - that is, the acceptance in principle of the "nuclear umbrella" concept, to accept this concept as the basis for the solution of the problem of eliminating nuclear delivery vehicles.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

But so far we have failed to do so -- and we have failed because the Western Powers do not want to take the path of compromise on the question of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and are trying to involve the Committee in a discussion of their position and in solving the question on the basis of their concept of a percentage reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. That is the real obstacle to the reaching of agreement on the basis for the activities of the working group. It is there, in fact, that lie the roots of many of our difficulties in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, which still have not yielded any practical results, although today, as our Chairman has pointed out, the Committee is holding its 200th meeting.

So long as the position of the Western Powers remains as it is today, that is, so long as the Western Powers insist on an approach which would maintain the material possibility of waging a nuclear war until the end of the disarmament process -- and I stress this aspect of the matter -- there will, of course, be no movement forward and no agreement. This should be absolutely clear to all of us.

We address an urgent appeal to the Western Powers to respond, to move forward to meet the wishes of the majority of the Committee, and to agree to the solution of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in compliance with two basic positions of principle:

First, all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, except those which would form part of the "nuclear umbrella", must be eliminated at the earliest stage of disarmament;

Second, the agreed quantity of missiles to be retained till the end of the third stage of disarmament must be a strictly limited minimum.

Only such an approach, with which the "nuclear umbrella" proposal is fully in keeping, will eliminate at the earliest stage of disarmament -- that is, at its first stage -- the possibility of unleashing a nuclear war. That is the most important thing at present; that is the only way to solve the problem.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): If I might, I should like to say merely a few words in reply to what the representative of the Soviet Union has just said. I do not mean them to be a further contribution to the discussion; I say them merely in exercise of the right of reply.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

First of all I should like to say that I have listened with much interest to what Mr. Tsarapkin has said. I welcomed the moderate tone in which he spoke, and I certainly wish to study very carefully what he has said. However, I think I should make this observation straight away. The representative of the Soviet Union still seems to be speaking, as I suggested he had been speaking last time, on some kind of assumption that it is the deliberate policy of the Western Powers at this Conference to refuse to examine the "nuclear umbrella" at all, and still more to refuse to examine the Gromyko "nuclear umbrella" in a working group. That is precisely what I have said is not the case. What we have said -- and I shall repeat it -- is that this is certainly one of the subjects which the working group should study; and both the United States representative and I have said that we should perhaps give it priority in the work of the group.

If that is so -- and I beg the Soviet representative to study carefully what we have said on this subject --, I should like to ask in return why it is impossible for the Soviet delegation to accept the kind of formula for setting up the group which Mr. Timberlake mentioned towards the close of his observations this morning. I should like to ask the representative of the Soviet Union to study this point carefully and to consider whether in fact the assurances given to him by the United States representative are not indeed sufficient for him to be able to enter a working group with the understanding that the subject he wishes to have discussed in that group will certainly be one of the major subjects for discussion.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to reply at once to the question put by the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason. We have already cleared up this point before. The United States representative Mr. Timberlake, in expounding his formula before the Committee, explained that this formula envisages such a procedure for considering the problem of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles as would automatically lead to the consideration of both approaches: the approach based on the principle contained in the "nuclear umbrella" proposal, and the approach based on the old United States proposal for a percentage reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

But you yourselves realize that such unthinkable terms of reference for the working group, which contain contradictory, mutually-exclusive approaches, would inevitably lead to the result that the working group would right from the beginning find itself involved in the very same controversies which we are carrying on here in the Committee. So long as we have not reached agreement in the Committee on the fundamental aspect of the matter, so long as we have not a common platform and reached agreement on the principles of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, any attempt to engage in the discussion of technical details is inevitably doomed to failure; all this would be in an impasse.

It is impossible to understand why we should have recourse to camouflage. Would it not be better to continue the discussion of the principle here in the Committee and try nevertheless to reach agreement, than to transfer this unfinished discussion to a working group? That is why under these conditions we see no point in creating a working group. We must first reach agreement on a common platform, on the general bases of principle for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and then create a working group to deal with the practical questions and technical details which arise in connexion with the implementation of this agreement in principle.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): Before reading out the communiqué I want to repair a sin of omission committed by me this morning. I should very much like to welcome back to our midst Mr. Lobodycz, who is now the leader of the Polish delegation. My welcome is no less warm for being late.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 200th meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Mrs. A. Myrdal, Ambassador of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Italy, the United States and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 23 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

